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U.S. TAIWAN-CHINA POLICY: THE KEY TOWARDS MANAGING REGIONAL STABILITY IN ASIA
The status of Taiwan is arguably the most critical challenge to stability in Asia today.
Unfortunately, United States policy on Taiwan has been inconsistent since 1949. In light of the region's profound strategic importance to the both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States and its allies, it is time to redefine U.S. Taiwan policy in the larger context of U.S. relations with the PRC. Successful management of the Taiwan issue can turn a situation that is currently fraught with danger into a positive lever to assist the PRC's non-provocative emergence as a responsible regional power that is fully integrated into the international community.
UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN
Prior to U.S. establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the United States recognized Taiwan Taiwan. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe was the major focus of American foreign policy. The U.S. pursued an unambiguous containment strategy toward the USSR and constructed the NATO alliance to provide collective security for Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet attack. During this period the PRC threat was perceived as less dangerous because it was preoccupied with internal issues and with large numbers of Soviet troops stationed along its border. Consequently, U.S. policy toward the PRC focused on trade and economic relations, with a view towards using the PRC to counterbalance possible Soviet inroads in Asia. The U.S. pursued a policy of "strategic ambiguity" to keep both Taiwan and the PRC unsure about the depth of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. The PRC has expended considerable effort to upgrade its missile programs, both tactical and strategic. According to the Cox Report, during the 1990's the PRC conducted extensive espionage activities against U.S. national weapons laboratories at Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Oak Ridge. 7 The result was the theft of secret U.S. nuclear weapons and missile guidance system technology. These secrets will allow the PRC to improve their tactical and strategic missile forces, including their intercontinental nuclear capability.
The PRC tactical missile guidance improvements will, for the first time, make limited missile strikes on Taiwan a viable tactic for forcible reunification. Conversely, a Taiwanese economy and infrastructure destroyed by massive missile strikes would be little use to China. Asia have continued to make PRC support necessary to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.
The deterioration in U.S. relations with North Korea, and that country's threat to develop nuclear weapons, have made the PRC an important partner in controlling tensions in the region. If the PRC can secure concessions from North Korea, it will enhance PRC stature in the region.
PRC STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN TAIWAN
The modern PRC claim to Taiwan is rooted in the 1949 Communist victory on the mainland and the flight of the Nationalists to Formosa, now called Taiwan. The PRC has since maintained that Taiwan is part of "One China" and must eventually be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. Yet in truth, though it has been ruled by outside powers in the past, Taiwan has never been completely integrated with mainland China. Chinese claims to
Taiwan as a renegade province are tenuous at best. 16 Reunification has long been a matter of Chinese national pride. Today, however, it has become more critical. As the PRC's experiment with capitalism blossoms, the Chinese Communist Party must work harder to maintain its legitimacy. Similarly, the party has loosened its grip in many areas of Chinese life in order to promote economic growth. Collective farms have been abolished and farmers are now allowed to lease land from the government for up to 25 years. The household registration system that formerly controlled Chinese movement has also been dropped. Combined with the growth of an interstate type highway system, this has led to an unprecedented movement of people throughout the country, especially from rural into urban areas. A middle class has emerged which is larger than the entire U.S. population.
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The reunification of Hong Kong to the mainland is also affecting the communist government. Allowed to retain its capitalist system, the enclave is creating subtle pressure on the PRC to adopt the rule of law and capitalist practices. 18 Economic progress has raised expectations for better living standards and many in China no longer regard the communist government with the reverence they once did: preferring to look elsewhere for solutions to the country's problems. 19 All these pressures are driving the Communist Party towards a crisis of legitimacy. To remain in power it must retain its stature as the guardian of Chinese Nationalism.
For its own survival, it cannot afford to be perceived as "losing" Taiwan. 20 This presents the dangerous possibility that the PRC Communist party, struggling to remain in power, could strike at Taiwan as its only means to save itself.
There is other strategic rationale for China to pursue reunification. The first is to control access to shipping routes. This control has both defensive and offensive facets. From a defensive perspective, the Chinese economy is dependent on shipping for imports of raw materials and exports of its products. A 1993 Center for Naval Analysis study noted that about one third of the world's shipping passed through the South China Sea. 21 Additionally, as the Chinese economy grows, it is becoming more dependent on Middle Eastern oil shipped through the Taiwan Strait. The PRC has been a net importer of oil since 1993. 22 A second reason for PRC commitment to reunification is related to the first: China desires to become a regional power. China is the largest country in the region and feels it has a rightful place as one of the region's leaders. It also perceives that the U.S. opposes this goal and is practicing "containment" to maintain the current regional balance of power. Emergence as a respected regional power will help China preserve access to the energy sources it needs and deter interdiction by any regional competitor. Additionally, the possibility of finding oil reserves in the South China Sea is a motivation for Chinese expansion and has provoked territorial disputes with other nations in the region. 24 In order to facilitate its emergence as a regional power, China is pursuing an open ocean navy by purchasing modern naval vessels from Russia. Taiwan stands between the PRC, unrestricted access to the oceans, and the increase in regional power that unification could enable.
The PRC's desire to acquire Taiwan is also founded on economic considerations. Taiwan has a booming economy and, as will be described below, is one of the leading foreign investors in the PRC. The island is one of the world's leading micro chip manufacturers and has the capability to produce the advanced technology China needs for its future military weapons systems. Acquisition of Taiwan would provide the PRC with a needed economic capacity and substantial increase in production capability.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN TAIWAN
The United States has strategic diplomatic, military and economic interests in a peaceful, favorable resolution of the Taiwan issue. Generally, the United States would prefer to maintain the status quo in Taiwan Taiwan currently enjoys a trade surplus estimated at $25 billion and is a leading foreign investor on the mainland with investments between $80 and $100 billion. The net effect of this economic interdependency is the de facto creation of "one economy, two governments." 29 For instance, in the first half of 2002, one quarter of Taiwan's exports were sold to the mainland. This represents the first time the mainland has topped the United States as a market for Taiwanese exports. 30 Independence could result in an enormous economic loss to both the PRC and Taiwan should it be followed with a break in economic ties as well. The first pillar of policy should be maintenance of a modified "One China" strategy. Each of the three parties has interpreted the term "One China" differently. The PRC interprets "One China" as meaning that the PRC is the lawful Chinese government, and that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. Taiwan interpreted the "One China" policy to mean just the opposite: that Taiwan constituted the sole legitimate government of China and would one day rejoin the mainland in a leadership role. 32 Although diametrically opposite, both interpretations were based on a common precept: a "unified" China (Taiwan and the mainland/PRC). However, since the democratization of Taiwan in 1996, the island has moved away from this interpretation toward a desire for independence. This threatens to break the common basis for Taiwanese and PRC "One China" perceptions. Complicating this dichotomy is the U.S. policy towards China. The U.S. has deliberately kept its interpretation of "One China" vague, allowing both belligerents to believe that theirs was the correct definition of the policy. The policy must be precisely defined or, just like the policy of strategic ambiguity, risk dangerous miscalculations of American resolve in the region.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. TAIWAN POLICY
The U.S. should clarify its "One China" policy by recognizing the PRC as the "One" but also making clear that the integration of Taiwan would be a Taiwanese decision. The U.S.
policy should explicitly state that, absent a Taiwanese decision to reunite, the U.S. favors maintaining the status quo and will intervene, militarily if necessary, to preserve it. This clarification represents a major change in U.S. policy and carries risks, primarily of provoking the PRC. To mitigate these risks, the policy clarification must include strong U.S. pressure on
Taiwan not to declare independence, and assurances to the PRC that America would not recognize such a declaration.
Concurrently Studies is a step along this path and should continue. 37 Other initiatives could include increasing Taiwanese officer enrollment in U.S. defense schools. Similarly, the United States should proceed with Patriot 3 sales to Taiwan as a defense measure against PRC missiles.
The U.S. should also revisit the requirement of the 1998 Defense Authorization Act to study the possibility of providing Taiwan a missile defense capability. Beyond providing Patriot missiles, America should strongly consider extending her future missile defense system to protect Taiwan. U.S. missile defense of Taiwan can serve as a bargaining tool to elicit reductions in PRC missiles aimed at Taiwan.
The third pillar requires reinvigorating existing treaties in the region and perhaps establishing new ones. There has never been an organization equivalent to NATO in the Pacific. Asia lacks the consensus of culture, political views and perception of a common threat that underlies NATO. Consequently, the United States has pursued security and stability through bilateral and limited multilateral treaties and pacts. 38 The open sea lanes and balancing increasing PRC influence. For Japan, this step can be a logical follow-on to the 1997 agreement on security cooperation, in negotiation since the early 1990s and concluded after the PRC's 1995-1996 missile provocations against Taiwan. 40 Japan is already a partner in ASEAN Plus Three but is not a formal ASEAN member. 41 Full ASEAN membership could help satisfy Japanese desire to assume a greater role in the region while contributing to improving Japanese credibility among other Asian nations. Tightening the association as a counter to increasing PRC hegemony may prove harder in the case of South Korea, which sees good PRC relations as a key to managing the North Korean dispute. South
Korean trade with the PRC has also leapt five fold since 1992. 42 Offering the PRC admission to ASEAN could serve to win South Korean cooperation while simultaneously engaging the PRC.
Criteria for PRC admission should be carefully constructed with a view to shaping PRC reforms in economic, military and political transparency. The allure of ASEAN membership for the PRC would be increased stature in the region and the benefit of belonging to a regional economic association. External to ASEAN, India is also emerging as a competitor to PRC influence in
Asia. The United States should exploit this development by working to improve ties with India as a counterweight to increasing PRC influence in the region.
The United States should also reinforce its economic relationship with Taiwan. In addition to support for Taiwan's admittance to the WTO in "separate customs territory" status, America should pursue a free trade agreement with Taiwan. This free trade agreement would have economic and security implications for a trade partner which represents the tenth largest U.S.
export market, immediately behind the PRC. 43 From an American perspective there can be two favorable outcomes to the Taiwan situation. Integration but counter balancing the PRC will prevent aggression toward Taiwan, preserving the status quo until the PRC democratizes and the two entities either reunify peacefully or decide to recognize each other's independence. Absent PRC democratization, the United States must preserve the status quo of a Taiwan that is independent in all but name.
Either outcome will require a coherent, consistent U.S. policy and the commitment of military, diplomatic and economic means for the foreseeable future.
MANAGING PRC EMERGENCE
The PRC's eventual emergence as a regional, and perhaps world, power is highly probable. Its economy has grown exponentially in the last decade and that growth appears to be continuing. The Communist government has thus far successfully walked the fine line between liberalization and maintaining control of the country. A nation of over 1 billion people, the PRC represents an enormous untapped market that lures most developed market economies. This demographic weight also makes the PRC a dangerous and capable future Asian land power. Optimistically, the PRC's emergence as a major power could be a force for stability in the region if the country exercises that power responsibly. The opposite is also true.
Consequently, the PRC's neighbors throughout Asia worry about the emergence of a potentially belligerent super power in their backyard. The character of emerging PRC power and its application remains in doubt and is a source of concern and anxiety within the region.
Until the picture becomes clearer, PRC emergence must be managed to ensure stability in the region. The United States has the capability to organize, facilitate and manage that emergence. It is in America's best interest for the defense of allies and the preservation of regional stability. Collectively, these measures mitigate the deleterious impacts of an emerging PRC superpower. The intent is to insure regional stability while creating the conditions for continued economic prosperity for all regional actors; the U.S. included. These policies will not "contain" China, for its emergence as a regional power is likely inevitable. Instead they are intended to manage its emergence during the first critical stages by establishing conditions for U.S. cooperation that will also be advantageous to the PRC.
The first condition is Chinese renunciation of the use of force or coercion to obtain reunification with Taiwan. Indications of compliance would include a public renouncement of forcible annexation and a severe reduction or elimination of the missiles aimed at Taiwan.
Achieving this condition will require a demonstrated U.S. commitment to the PRC and Taiwan to guarantee the status quo as already explained. This commitment must be made clearly and forcefully. Complementing this commitment must be an increase in confidence building measures with the PRC to prove the U.S. will not support Taiwanese independence.
Related to the Taiwan question is the PRC's provocative stance on other disputed territories in the region. Specifically, the PRC must renounce aggressive pursuance of her claims in the South China Sea. In this area, the PRC has territorial disputes with Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam. Islands claimed by China can serve to control shipping flows or include suspected oil deposits and are thus of immense importance to the PRC. The communist government has strongly advocated using world bodies to resolve disputes. It must heed its own advice, withdraw from disputed occupied areas, and negotiate a settlement or submit its claims for arbitration. Successful provocative or aggressive PRC actions to secure these disputed areas could potentially derail the U.S.'s ability to manage regional stability.
The PRC's respect for basic human rights must improve dramatically. The central government has relaxed some controls over its citizenry during the last decade, but has likely done so as a self preservation tactic and not to empower the populace. 44 The The final condition of U.S. cooperation will be the most difficult and long term. The PRC must move towards a representative form of government. This will be exceedingly difficult for the Communist Party. It will directly threaten the Party's control of the country and possibly its very survival. However, economic reforms already have begun to weaken the Party's control of the country. Also, the rise of the internet is allowing Chinese citizens to experience other cultures, escape their isolation, and expose them to alternative systems of governance.
Nevertheless, the government continues to try and control internet access, but the efforts appear futile. 47 Improvements in living standards brought by the growing economy will probably combine with these factors to create rising expectations in the Chinese population and degrade the control of the population so necessary for communism to remain viable. These growing social expectations will likely be met only by democratization and the liberty it brings.
Paradoxically, these factors place the U.S. in a position where regional stability depends upon the success of the communist government's ability to continue control of the populace while it transitions to a more representative form of government. Alternatively, the PRC could lose control and disintegrate into anarchy, adversely affecting both regional stability and the U.S.
economy.
SUMMARY
Successful resolution of the Taiwan dispute is inextricably linked to the larger question of U.S.-Chinese relations. America must enunciate and follow a clear, consistent policy and demonstrate its willingness to enforce that policy. It appears inevitable that the PRC will eventually emerge as a major world power. A belligerent and powerful PRC is a threat to the region and thus to U.S. national interests. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to manage the PRC's emergence as a regional and world power for the benefit of both nations and the region. Taiwan can be a lever to solidify this relationship while serving as a vehicle to achieve desired reforms in the PRC. In this regard, the complex and ambiguous "One China" policy can actually serve the interests of all parties as each makes the compromises necessary for continued economic development and regional stability. However, the path to the future is paved with uncertainty and danger. The PRC's authoritative and repressive communist regime has a propensity for provocation. Conversely, the ambiguous and disjointed U.S. foreign policy and potential over-reaction to PRC regional challenges could also lead to catastrophic regional failure. Ironically, successful management of the Taiwan issue can be the catalyst for further cooperation, transparency, prosperity and regional stability.
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